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Telling Stories. Story and History in Arendt´s Thought 
 
Abstract: Arendt devoted most of her political writings to the relationship between life 
writing and constructing citizenship. In all her biographies we meet the same idea: Human 
Beings have a narrative identity and only when this identity can be constructed and shown in 
the public realm, human beings can tell their stories and act upon their history.  
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“One can‟t say how life is, how chance or fate deals with people, except by telling the 
tale.”1 
 
Arendt‟s extensive works are strewn with reflections on narrativity, biography and the role 
of tales and stories. But there is absolutely no definite or structured theory on these subjects
2
. 
Therefore, they have sometimes gone unnoticed or been considered as elements of minor 
importance within her thinking. More global reading has been needed to underline the 
relevance of life and its narration in Arendt‟s production. Pioneering work in this area has 
been carried out by Julia Kristeva and Sheila Benhabib.  
Following the path marked by these authors, and by Dana Villa, Lisa Jane Disch and 
Jacques Taminiaux, in this paper I intend to deal with the general framework of these issues, 
which in Arendt are quite dispersed. A thorough reading of her notes on ideas on life, 
biography and narrative reveals two important aspects. The first is the early appearance of 
this subject-matter, which can already be found in her second book: Rahel Varnhagen. The 
Life of a Jewess, begun in Germany in 1929, and finished in the US in 1958. The other 
outstanding element is that Arendt carries out her approach from two different angles: 
methodology and ontology.  
The methodological question is strongly linked to the difference between story and 
history, and also to criticism of the methodology of the social sciences in 1950s. Facing a 
perspective of history taken as a lineal, progressive or regressive development, which can be 
explained by means of general concepts and causal connections, Arendt chooses 
                                                          
1
 Arendt, H.; McCarthy, M., Between Friends. The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy. 
1949-1975, Harcourt Brace & Company, New York, 1995, May 31, p. 295.  
2
 Julia Kristeva shows the relationship between Arendt and Aristotle, which does not make her a Neo-
Aristotelian, as the German writer does not pay heed to the technical details of the narrative, but rather 
concentrates on the political dimension and narration of the action: “Thus, having noted the discordance 
between lived history and narrated history, Arendt does not think that what is essential in narration is to be 
found in the construction of a cohesion, internal to the story, in narrative art. She is fully aware of this „formal‟ 
or „formalist‟ aspect of Aristotelian theory: the beatiful requires the union of various parts (taxis) as much as it 
does greatness (megethos). But she spends little time on the technical aspects of narrative and sticks more 
closely to the Nicomachean Ethics. According to that text, what is especially important for eyewitness narrative 
is firstly to recognize the „moment of ending or closure‟, and secondly to „identify the agent‟ of the story. The 
art of narrative resides in the ability to condense the action into an exemplary moment, to extract it from the 
continuous flow of time, and reveal a who”, Kristeva, J., Hannah Arendt. Life Is a Narrative, University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2001, p. 17.  
comprehension and the view of history as crystallizations of elements
3
. These topics appear 
predominantly, but not only, in The Origins of Totalitarianism and in Between Past and 
Future. In both these texts there is a crucial question: How is history told? How does history 
become story?  
The ontological angle deals with the other side of the question, “What is history?” or more 
broadly speaking, “What is the human life that makes history?” In this case Arendt‟s 
reflections refer to Aristotle‟s philosophy and begin with a very clear distinction between Zoé 
(biological life) and Bios (human life).This is the core of her first great work The Human 
Condition. And obviously, this human life which is such because it is shared with others, 
because it grants the human being a narrative identity, is linked to the no less relevant 
question, “What role does the story of one‟s own life, autobiography and biography, play in 
the knowledge of oneself and the understanding of reality?” These are the issues that are 
covered in two key works in Arendt‟s thought: the Philosophical Diary and her other 
collection of biographical essays, Men in Dark Times.  
Life is, as Kristeva points out, a fundamental topic in all Arendt‟s work. However, the 
German author is not a vitalist thinker nor does she ever write an autobiography (her 
Philosophical Diary is not a personal diary, but a set of notebooks in which she wrote 
reflections on varied topics in a chronological order), nor is she a writer of novels or stories. 
She wrote only one long biography and a series of short biographical essays, in which she 
portrays the characters, but does not give intimate or private details of their lives. The thinker 
who gives a key role to narrated life is not a prolific writer on this subject. In her work, the 
telling of stories has a fundamentally cognitive and human purpose: by narrating what has 
happened to us, or rather, what has happened to others, we comprehend reality. Likewise, it 
has an ontological purpose and a political one, as it permits the establishment of the narrative 
identity and preserves the remembrance of the creation of the community.  
In order to throw light on this apparent contradiction, we must, firstly, remember the strict 
difference established by Arendt between private and public life, her severe criticism of 
introspection and the almost indecent display of oneself to others, as seen in Rousseau, 
together with her rejection of psychoanalysis. Narrating life is not the same as putting one‟s 
private life in public view. And, secondly, what Arendt means by “life” must be understood: 
“the expression designates the „moment between birth and death‟, as long as it can be 
represented by a narrative, and shared with other men”4. That is to say, for her, life is 
specifically human, and, as such, plural: an entrance and exit from a public space by means of 
action and word. An entrance that shows an individual who carries out actions that can be 
narrated
5
.  
By means of a public appearance, by words and actions
6
, the subject creates himself as 
such and reaches an identity, which is narrative. And thus he needs the presence of others 
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and, a posteriori, the memory of such actions and words. The space of appearance is, 
therefore, the condition demanded to reach identity, as this is not a given, but reached in a 
plural context. In contrast with those philosophical doctrines that insist on the autonomy of 
the self, on its sovereignty over action, Arendt sees freedom as a birth, as a capacity to initiate 
something new, something that no longer depends on the agent, but which earns its own 
reality and demands the participation of the spectator in order to grasp its significance.  
In fact, it is the spectator and not the actor who will tell the tale, who will immortalise the 
actions of the hero by means of the story. Thus, the active role in the story corresponds to the 
spectator, who becomes the historian or story-teller, and does not correspond to the actor: “It 
is not the actors, but the spectators, if they are capable of thought and memory, who turn the 
polis into an organization that is creative of memory and/or history/histories”7. This also 
becomes clear now because a true biography focuses on the action through which one reaches 
one‟s identity and not on the private details nor on the information which does not underline 
individuality, but rather what is generic: “The moment we want to say who somebody is, our 
very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he is; we get entangled in a description of 
qualities he necessarily shares with others like him; we begin to describe a type or a 
„character‟ in the old meaning of the word, with the result that his specific uniqueness 
escapes us”8.  
It is the historian who must narrate the history and change it into stories: “Action reveals 
itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to the backward glance of the historian, who indeed 
always knows better what it was all about than the participants […] Even though stories are 
the inevitable results of action, it is not the actor but the storyteller who perceives and 
„makes‟ the story”9. The historian allows human fragility to be overcome by keeping in mind 
the actions carried out by human beings and confers special glory on great feats: “The hero, 
the „doer of great deeds and speaker of great words,‟ as Achilles was called, needed the poet -
not the prophet, but the seer- whose divine gift sees in the past what is worth telling in the 
present and the future”10.  
To do so, Arendt presents some conditions in her different works, but they can be 
summarised in objectivity as impartiality, imagination
11
, the enlarged mentality of Kant and 
the understanding heart of King Solomon. These characteristics of the historian are necessary 
to understand horror and pain, in particular. In contrast with Adorno, Arendt believes that 
horror can be narrated and understood
12
. Not only can it be done, but it must be done, 
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 We must not forget that understanding is not forgiving, and for Arendt it has a very exact meaning: 
“Comprehension, however, does not mean denying the outrageous, deducting the unprecedented from 
precedents, or explaining phenomena by such analogies and generalities that the impact of reality and the shock 
of experience are no longer felt. It means, rather, examining and bearing consciously the burden that events have 
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And this again means that “the political function of the narrator –whether he is a novelist, 
poet or historian– is to show things as they are, because by means of the narrative of 
particular facts –even the most painful– they lose their contingent character and gain a certain 
humanly-comprehensible meaning. Likewise, Walter Benjamin also pointed out the need and 
importance of relating events: not merely because those fragments of the past that otherwise 
would be forgotten are recaptured, but because the memory of the facts redeems us from their 
unbearable reality”13.  
In his work, the historian must, as I have stated, avoid the temptation of using general 
concepts and causal explanations. And he must especially steer clear of the great stumbling 
block that all philosophy of history has been unable to avoid: “That every individual life 
between birth and death can eventually be told as a story with beginning and end is the 
prepolitical and prehistorical condition of history, the great story without beginning and end. 
But the reason why each human life tells its story and why history ultimately becomes the 
storybook of mankind, with many actors and speakers and yet without any tangible authors, is 
that both are the outcome of action. For the great unknown in history, that has baffled the 
philosophy of history in the modern age, arises not only when one considers history as a 
whole and finds that its subject, mankind, is an abstraction which never can become an active 
agent; the same unknown has baffled political philosophy from its beginning in antiquity and 
contributed to the general contempt in which philosophers since Plato have held the realm of 
human affairs”14. This means then, a conception of history that is very different from that 
found in modern philosophy, a vision of the story hat focuses on the fragments, on the 
extraordinary:  “It is never a concept that gives a conclusive definition, but means that the 
story is included in a new type of narrative, which talks of fragmentation rather than totality, 
that concentrates on historical incidents, anecdotes, biographies, literary works”15.  
The tale of the action, that is, of truly human life, has a political aim in Arendt: to preserve 
the memory of human actions. And another methodological one: “In the narration of stories 
Arendt finds the methodology that allows her to represent and understand the experiences 
that create both political concepts and historical events. In short, by story-telling we 
recuperate the tales of history, and these make sense of what surrounds us”16. Therefore the 
most aesthetic aspects become the background.  
The actor, then, makes history: by means of his action he creates and preserves political 
bodies, thus laying down the foundations for remembrance, for history
17
. History is the story 
of the actions that must not be forgotten; the narration of what is truly human, of a time that is 
not natural-cyclical, nor eternal. Therefore it takes the shape of biography, the story of human 
life, which begins with birth and ends with death, and elapses in a lineal time-span
18
. But the 
story and its transmission require the presence of the spectator and the narrator. For this 
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reason Arendt writes biographies and not autobiographies: stories that relate the lives of 
human beings who perform actions worthy of living in our memory, which save the fragility 
of the action.  
These considerations also explain another characteristic of the Arendtian biographies. 
Although humans share cyclical biological time with other animals, this is not the aspect 
which should be told or remembered: it belongs to the space of intimacy, of what is hidden 
from the public view, the space where key events for humans occur: birth, love and death
19
. 
However, what must be told is what is public, that which reflects the human condition, plural 
and political. Thus the tales of the lives of the men and women we find in Arendt‟s work 
always recount certain political experiences. They are stories that allow understanding of 
reality, and culturally mediate between the actor and the reader. This is particularly clear in 
the biographies of Rahel Varnhagen (the Jewish Pariah), Isak Dinesen (the author hidden 
behind the pseudonym), Walter Benjamin (the little hunchback who saw the break of the 
tradition), and Franz Kafka (the pariah among the pariahs). For Arendt, these lives share a 
common principle: the need to create a world through language, a world that may be 
inhabited by human beings. Humans have a narrative identity, as Arendt pointed out, and 
only when this identity can be achieved and shown in the public realm, can human beings tell 
their stories and act upon their history. 
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